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Abstract
In the face of an activist threat, management may be inclined to provide additional
disclosure to discourage potential intervention. This paper constructs an empirical model
to measure the threat of activism and voluntary disclosure using a data set of 92 industrials
focused activist events from 2008 to 2019. Propensity score matching is used to identify
close peer firms that experience a threat of activism at the time a campaign is announced.
Results from a difference in differences analysis indicate that firms targeted by hedge fund
activists provide additional disclosure in the two-year period following the campaign
announcement, as seen through an increase in the number of 8-Ks filed and an increase in
their associated word counts. As for the non-targeted peer firms, the results suggest that an
increase in the perceived threat of activism leads management to file fewer 8-Ks after an
intervention that are shorter in length, as well.
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Introduction
July 2017 marked the start of “the largest boardroom battle in the history of director
insurgencies” lead by hedge fund activist, Trian, against Proctor & Gamble (HerbstBayliss, 2017). At the start of this campaign, Trian had accumulated a stake of $3.5 billion
which represented roughly 1.5% of the voting stock. Trian’s multi-million dollar take-itor-leave-it campaign focused on appointing their CEO, Nelson Peltz, to the board of P&G.
However, this was no easy feat: P&G refused to cooperate on all accounts. In a press
release, CEO David Taylor cautioned shareholders that Trian had a “history of hidden
agendas that result in derailing companies” and wasting up to “25% of [other CEOs’] time
answering his questions or debating misinformed ideas.” Taylor and P&G would not fall
victim next.
The fight, which “spared no resource and pulled every string of influence,” forced
P&G’s management to pour over $100 million into campaign defense (Crawford, 2018).
Trian, on the other hand, spent less than a quarter of that. After 18 months of relentless
back-and-forth, Trian claimed victory in what was deemed to be the “largest proxy fight in
history,” claiming a seat for Nelson Peltz on P&G’s Board of Directors (Crawford 2018).
News of this agreement lead to significant share price appreciation a P&G’s stock saw a
“50% boost since before Peltz joined the board and gained 32% in 2019 alone”
(Ponomareva 2018). While this may have appeased shareholders, one must not forget the
public relations nightmare, extreme costs, and management distraction caused by Trian’s
tactics. In 2021, Nelson Peltz amicably relinquished his board member position stating that
“Trian believes the company is well positioned for continued, future success.”
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And, as anticipated, in August of 2021, the Financial Times revealed that Unilever
appears to be Trian’s next target (Elder 2021). Inherently, this move makes sense for Trian
as Unilever is one of P&G’s closest comparables and direct competitors. It is possible
Unilever is enticed by Trian’s expertise, or perhaps they dread the negative associations of
hedge fund activist campaigns. In any case, this series of events present the following
question: Was there anything Unilever could have done to avoid being Trian’s next
intervention, or was it inevitable following the P&G campaign? Further, did the threat of
activist intervention compel Unilever’s management to act defensively in advance of the
August 2021 article? This paper seeks to explore whether there is a response made by firms,
such as Unilever, when their closest competitor is targeted by an activist firm.
Literature Review
I. Hedge Fund Activism
While companies have remained weary regarding the efficacy of hedge fund
activists over the last decade, the motivation behind campaigns has seen a transformational
shift. In the early 2010s, hedge fund activism gained traction through proxy contests as few
firms had adequate poison pill infrastructure in place. When deployed properly, poison
pills significantly dilute voting rights if investors cross a certain threshold of ownership
stake in an investment. Prior to the mid-2010s, when this corporate governance tactic
became common practice, activists were able to rapidly pile into positions and wage proxy
wars to oust existing board members. According to Berg and Grossman (2019), the
efficiency of this process made proxy wars the most successful activist strategy, with an
average pass rate of 57.38% in 2011. However, due to rising costs and the wide-spread use
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of poison pills in recent years, full-fledged proxy wars have become far less common.
Lazard’s 2020 Annual Review of Shareholder Activism illustrates that a mere 18% of
proxy contest threats became proxy wars last year, and 82% of the Board seats activists
secured came about via negotiated settlements.
With the new challenges associated to proxy wars, activists turned to M&A activity
to unlock shareholder value. That said, many acquisitions and divestments fail to maximize
shareholder value. According to Malcom (2019), 53% of buyers underperformed their
industry benchmark in terms of total shareholder returns in the two years following their
most recent acquisition. So, it is worth asking why activist hedge funds are deploying over
40% of total activist capital into these M&A driven pursuits (Lazard 2020). The answer
can be traced to the simple idea of value creation. Surprisingly, most managers do not
prioritize value creation in M&A transactions, but those who do outperform peers by 14%
(PWC 2020). The role of hedge fund activists is to enhance returns along the value chain,
and as such, these campaigns are specifically engineered to prioritize M&A value creation.
Thus, it is no surprise that 73 M&A activist campaigns were initiated in 2020. Whether this
and other forms of activism translate into company outperformance is highlighted in the
subsequent discussion.
Significant literature suggests that hedge fund activists may help improve
shareholder value (Allaire, 2015; Edmans, 2020; Denes et al., 2017; Brav et al., 2008). For
example, Allaire’s (2015) study of roughly 2,000 activist interventions finds a statistically
significant improvement in operating performance of the target company in the five-years
post-treatment. Even the most scrutinized and controversial forms of activism, such as
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increasing leverage and employing hostile tactics, yield positive long-term effects. Edmans
(2020) further concludes that activist hedge funds that have concentrated portfolios, access
to resources, and aligned incentives are more likely to display ‘engaged ownership’ which
in turn boosts shareholder value. Denes et al. (2017), determine that shareholder activism
has become increasingly value accretive over time, suggesting that campaigns in the 1980s
and 1990s had very few consequential effects relative to their present-day counterparts. In
fact, it appears that the market even anticipates that hedge fund activism will improve
value, as Brav et al. (2008) find positive abnormal returns associated with campaign
announcements.
Despite clear empirical evidence of contributions to shareholder value, hedge fund
activist interventions are often met with resistance. In fact, Johnson and Swem (2017) posit
that the reputation an activist possesses is a key determinant in the target company’s
response to a campaign. The paper finds that management teams are much more likely to
implement the changes proposed by a high reputation activist. The reason being,
implementing changes and settling for the activist demands will reduce the risk of costly
and time-consuming proxy fights. This trend holds true even in scenarios where the
ownership stake is significantly smaller. However, even in high reputation scenarios,
campaign objectives may be misaligned with management vision, which can breed intense
tension and conflict between the two parties. It is possible that firm value maximization
may be achieved in more than one way, with the target and the activist possessing differing
views.
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Furthermore, a growing body of literature concludes that not all activist-proposed
corporate strategies produce successful outcomes (Coffee and Palia, 2014; Kuvandikov et
al., 2021). It is probable that corporate executives running target firms have a better
understanding of possible internal levers to maximize firm value than outsiders. Coffee and
Palia (2014) substantiate this claim, critiquing the opportunistic nature and short-term
focus of activist hedge fund investors. Kuvandikov et al. (2021) explore this assertation in
the context of activist involvement in takeover scenarios where short termism is
particularly prevalent. The paper indicates that activists may encourage M&A activity to
benefit from takeover premiums while compromising long-term value in the post-merger
integration environment.
Considering the evolution of activism and the dichotomy in contemporary
literature, one can better understand management resistance towards campaigns of the sort.
Once targeted, management teams are put at risk of job loss, board member turnover, and
shifts in strategic vision. And to what end? The possibility of improved shareholder value,
but far from guaranteed. With this degree of ambiguity, it is reasonable that managers take
actions to deter hedge fund activists. In this paper, I examine whether management teams
use voluntary disclosure as a mechanism to evade hedge fund activist intervention.
II. Activism and Voluntary Disclosure
A myriad of studies surrounding the topic of voluntary disclosure in firms targeted
by shareholder activists was produced in the mid-2010s (Chen and Jung, 2015; Khurana et
al., 2017). Cheng and Jung (2015) consider whether activist intervention influences a
management team’s tendency to release guidance. The paper finds that, on average, target
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firms suspend or reduce the amount of guidance offered in the quarter after an activist
takeover, even if they have consistently provided guidance in the past and display a
successful track record. However, the motivations for suspending or reducing guidance are
not fully explored by Chen and Jung (2015). Instead, this issue is taken up by Khurana et
al. (2017). They also track voluntary disclosure in the form of management guidance and
earnings management but focus on the quality of information. Khurana et al. (2017) use
machine learning to distinguish between positive and negative disclosure announcements
in 8-Ks. While Khurana et al. (2017) corroborate the findings of Chen and Jung (2015), the
paper also concludes that managers are more likely to withhold information surrounding
negative earnings guidance and more likely to increase the level of real earnings
management in the post campaign period.
Other literature attempts to quantify the effect of voluntary disclosure in the case
of specific activist strategies (Baginski et al., 2012; Baloria et al., 2019). Baginski et al.
(2012) consider voluntary management disclosure in the context of proxy wars, which
represented a significant fraction of activist campaigns at the time of the paper’s
publication. Because proxy contests are often associated with negative press, management
teams increase guidance during the treatment period (proxy war) and decrease guidance in
the post treatment period (post proxy war). The paper suggests that this voluntary increase
in disclosure is to boost shareholder confidence in management control and to signal that
poor past performance is temporary. Baginski et al. (2015) arrive at different results than
Chen and Jung (2015) and Khurana et al. (2017) indicating that proxy war and ESG
activism may actually encourage short term increases in company disclosure. This
conclusion holds true in other areas of the activist investing universe. Baloria et al. (2019)
9

evaluates the impact of shareholder activist political spending proposals on ESG
disclosures of the target companies. The paper determines that 20% of target companies
increase their ESG disclosures in the year following the activist proposal whether the
proposal is implemented or rescinded. This demonstrates the usefulness of shareholder
activism in triggering increased voluntary disclosure among target firms in the context of
ESG-related issues.
Thus, literature suggests that in the general sense, shareholder activism discourages
voluntary disclosure from the target firm, but that there may be special cases wherein it is
encouraged. One of these instances may be the case of a target firm’s industry peers (Park
et al., 2019; Bourveau and Schoenfeld, 2016). Park et al. (2019) examine voluntary
disclosure in cases of partial common ownership, situations where a single investor own
significant stakes in competing firms. Partial common ownership incentivizes companies
to consider the consequences of their actions relative to peers in the common owner’s
portfolio, breeding competition that otherwise would not exist. The paper concludes partial
common ownership incentivizes disclosure for the purpose of appeasing shareholders and
encouraging lasting investment. While Park et al. (2019) does not specifically address
shareholder activism, the paper demonstrates that companies issue disclosure to appear
more attractive than their industry peers. The same logic can be applied to Bourveau and
Schoenfeld (2016) who track the behavior of industry peers at the time one of their
competitors faces an activist intervention. Bourveau and Schoenfeld (2016) determine that
this threat of activism alone is enough to increase a non-target competitor’s guidance by a
statistically significant amount. My empirical study will most closely resemble the work
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of Bourveau and Schoenfeld (2016) as I too intend to look at the threat of activism on
management behavior of peer firms.
III. Contributions to Existing Literature
Existing literature on shareholder activism primarily explores voluntary disclosure
through the lens of management guidance. Yet, there are several appropriate proxies to
measure voluntary disclosure: management guidance, number of 8-Ks, 8-K word count,
and items classified as voluntary across all financial filings (He and Plumlee, 2020). He
and Plumlee (2020) explore the usefulness of these various proxies used to measure
voluntary disclosure. These measures all appear to be highly correlated, but the paper finds
that 8-K word count is the superior way to evaluate voluntary disclosure. He and Plumlee’s’
(2020) results suggest that previous literature surrounding activism and voluntary
disclosure may not be measured using the most accurate outcome variable. The bulk of the
literature on shareholder activism was published in the mid-2010s which explains this
discrepancy. I will study voluntary disclosure in the scope of 8-K word count as well as
filings count.
As discussed, a breadth of literature explores the implications of shareholder
activism during the pre-poison pill era. Not only is this data just simply outdated, but it
also no longer reflects the current hedge fund activist landscape. The objectives for
activism have shifted, and it is possible that company response has, as well. I will be
working with a new data set that incorporates the poison pill era of activism, consequently
factoring in the impact of stronger takeover defenses. It is possible that these stronger
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defenses will make management teams less worried about the threat of activism, and
possibly less inclined to release additional disclosures.
While certain papers examined the implications specific strategic activist goals
have on voluntary disclosure, there has yet to an empirical analysis the implications for
specific industries. According to Lazard’s Annual Review of Shareholder Activism,
Industrials have been the most targeted sector for activism in four out of the last five years.
So, this paper will explore how management teams in this industry respond to the threat of
activist intervention. Lastly, I will look at how the effect of activist intervention affects
disclosure over time. While much of the literature evaluates changes in disclosure over a
two-year horizon, I also look at the changes in disclosure over a one-year horizon. This test
reveals how firms respond to the activist threat over a shorter time horizon as well as a
longer time horizon.
Data and Methodology
I. Propensity Score Matching
Activist campaigns in the Industrials sector are identified using Bloomberg
Research. This database documents all hedge fund activist campaigns on companies listed
on the two major U.S. exchanges. Bloomberg’s categorization of hedge fund activist
campaigns is not limited to 13-D documented events. When a hedge fund has the intention
of engaging in activism, a 13-D must be filed when more than a 5% ownership stake is
acquired. However, not all hedge funds acquire a 5% stake before intervening. To account
for these smaller stake interventions, Bloomberg also identifies activist campaigns through
Rule 14a-1 through four disclosures, 8-Ks, letters to shareholders, letters to boards, and
12

financial news sources. Bloomberg also provides supplemental information on the
campaigns such as the campaign start date, activist objective, ownership stake size, and
whether a 13-D was filed. As seen in Table 1, Panels A and B, 92 Industrials-focused
campaigns have occurred since 2008 against firms situated in three primary subsectors:
Materials, Industrial Products, and Industrial Services.
Then Bloomberg’s activist campaign data is merged with corresponding financial
data from CompuStat and S&P CapIQ. The same financial statistics are aggregated for an
additional 777 firms, which make up the investable universe of Industrials companies that
have not been targeted by hedge fund activists. As seen in Table 2, relevant Balance Sheet
variables are adjusted to facilitate common size analysis. With these two clean data sets,
activist-targeted firms can now be matched to similar non-target counterparts. This
matching is achieved using propensity scores which map the set of highly dimensional X
onto one scalar function (the propensity score) using a logit regression. This parametrizes
the model such that each observation i with Di = 1 is matched with another observation
where Di = 0 using the propensity score as the matching estimator:
′

Pr(𝐷𝑖 = 1 | 𝑋𝑖 ) =

𝑒 𝑋𝑖 𝛾
′

1 + 𝑒 𝑋𝑖 𝛾

In the context of this study, the baseline characteristics, X, used to generate the
propensity scores of each firm are as follows: Log Total Assets, Log Market Cap, Market
to Book, Cash, Debt Intangibles, Capex, R&D, Return on Assets, and Dividends per Share.
Given that all the companies in this empirical study operate in the Industrials sector,
operational similarity is implicit. Thus, the focus of the propensity score matching is to
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align companies within the sector that display similar financial profiles, accounting for
their size, asset base, and leverage. Table 3 provides the regression results obtained from
the logit regression. After obtaining the propensity scores, the data is sorted by calendar
year and peer firms are selected using nearest neighbor matching without replacement.
More specifically, each activist targeted firm is matched with the non-targeted firm with
the closest propensity score in the same year as the campaign. This propensity matched
peer is then eliminated from the data set so that it cannot be matched with other campaigns.
Matching ensures that the complete data set includes the treatment group of 92 activist
targeted firms and the control group of 92 propensity matched peer firms.
As a preliminary robustness check, Table 4 reports the basic financial
characteristics for the two samples of interest. I report the means for these samples along
with the differences (and their standard errors). As expected, the difference in means for
these baseline characteristics between the activist and non-activist targeted firms are
generally well balanced. Apart from Capital Expenditures which is significant at the 10%
level, we fail to reject the null for the baseline characteristics at any conventional levels.
This suggest that there is little evidence of significant differences between the control and
treatment groups adding to the integrity of the study.
II. Difference-in-Differences Analysis
For the secondary phase of data collection, management disclosure in the form of
8-Ks and 6-Ks (foreign issuer 8-K equivalents) were downloaded from the SEC Edgar
database. For each activist-targeted firm and its matched peer, I obtain all 8-Ks released in
the two years pre and post campaign quarter. This timing is based on Bourveau and

14

Schoenfeld’s methodology for collecting guidance in their 2016 paper. In the complete
sample of 184 treated and untreated firms, there are 183,416 8-K filings that meet the above
criteria. After obtaining this raw data set, I use Python to pull the word count and filing
date of each 8-K. As discussed in the literature review, the word count data represents the
disclosure metric I will be using to generate the primary results in this study.
Given that the econometric model matches targeted firms with nearly identical nontarget firms, it is highly likely that the peer firms experienced the threat of activism at the
time their targeted counterpart experienced an intervention. In order to examine the effect
that this threat has on the peer firm’s disclosure, I rely on a difference-in-differences
analysis. This model attempts to mimic random assignment with treatment and control
samples. Furthermore, difference-in-differences research design controls for fixed effects,
contemporary trends in disclosure, and the changes in disclosure of the activist-targeted
firm. This model will refer to the propensity matched peers at the control group and activist
intervention firms as the treatment group. This is in line with the propensity score matching
estimation, where activist firms are denoted as the treated group. In this model, the control
group experiences the threat of activism, while the treatment group experiences an activist
intervention. The primary equation for the peer firms are as follows:
𝑘

𝑊𝐶𝑀;𝑇=0 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑀;𝑇=0 + 𝛾̃𝑀;𝑇=0 + 𝜃̃𝑀,𝐴;𝑇=0 + 𝜀̃𝑀,𝐸;𝑇=0
𝑗=1

𝑘

𝑊𝐶𝑀;𝑇=1 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑀;𝑇=1 + 𝛾̃𝑀;𝑇=1 + 𝜃̃𝑀,𝐴;𝑇=1 + 𝜀̃𝑀,𝐸;𝑇=1
𝑗=1
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The dependent variable WC, represents my disclosure proxy, 8-K word count. The
subscripts T = 0 and T = 1 represent the two-year pre-treatment period and two-year post
treatment period, respectively. The model also accounts for time fixed effects denoted as
𝛾̃𝑀;𝑇=0,1 and unobservable time-varying effects, 𝜃̃𝑀,𝐴;𝑇=0,1. And, it is highly unlikely onetime varying factor will drive the results given that the sample contains nearly 13 years of
data (from 2008 to 2021). To remove these fixed effects, the following equation takes the
difference of equations I and II from above:
𝑘

∆𝑊𝐶𝑀 = 𝑎 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑀 + 𝜀̃𝑀
𝑗=1

This effectively eliminates the firm fixed effects, and controls for other baseline
characteristics that may influence disclosure. These additional covariates include Log Total
Assets, Log Market Cap, Market to Book, Cash, Debt Intangibles, Capex, R&D, Return on
Assets, and Dividends per Share. The coefficient, 𝛽𝑗 , illustrates the effect of an activisttargeted firm’s change in disclosure upon intervention. And, the resulting intercept, 𝑎,
illustrates the effect of a non-targeted firm’s change in disclosure as the result of
intensifying activist threat. In other words, the difference-in-differences analysis isolates
the causal effect the threat of activism has on a non-targeted firm’s voluntary disclosure
wherein all other remaining unsystematic risk is captured by the error term, 𝜀̃𝑀 .
Thus, the model above can be used to generate the following regression
specification:
∆ln 𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑎𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑡
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Where ∆ ln 𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the natural logarithm of 8-K word count for treatment firm i of pair j,
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 is a binary variable denoting whether the company faced an activist
intervention, and 𝑎𝑡 are the time fixed effects common to the firm pair. Because activist
intervention may be correlated with time related trends, I include these fixed effects to
ensure that 𝛿1 is unbiased. Baseline characteristics are incorporated into the model as
additional controls. In this regression, 𝛿0 reports the average change in disclosure for peer
firms that are considered to be under the threat of activism, and 𝛿1 represents how activisttargeted firm disclosure differs from the peer group. Thus, the sum of 𝛿0 and 𝛿1 represents
the net effect an activist intervention has on voluntary disclosure.
Discussion and Results
I. Main Results: Word Count
Management response to threat of activist intervention is unclear ex ante. Managers
of peer companies that have not yet been targeted may be inclined to provide additional
disclosure as a show of good faith to shareholders and activists (e.g., Bourveau and
Schoenfeld, 2016; Park et al., 2019). In contrast, managers might also suspend or reduce
guidance in hopes of remaining unnoticed or as a way to hide unfavorable results (e.g.,
Chen and Jung, 2015; Khurana et al., 2017).
Table 5 reports the effect of activist threat on voluntary disclosure, measured using
the natural logarithm of 8-K word count, DeltaWC(ln) over the two years pre and post
campaign start. In Columns (1) and (2), the results are reported without the inclusion of
fixed effects; in Columns (3) and (4), year and year-quarter time fixed effects are included,
respectively. Baseline characteristics are included as additional controls in Columns (2),
17

(3), and (4). The inclusion of additional covariates and fixed effects significantly increases
the R-squared. These results make sense as they allow the model to explain the
commonality between the peer control firms and the targeted treatment firms. The
coefficient on ActivistEvent represents the effect an intervention has on a targeted firm’s
disclosure, while the intercept represents the effect an intervention has on a peer firm’s
disclosure.
The results indicate that the threat of activism on control peer firms is mixed and
not highly statistically significant. Column (3), which includes year fixed effects and
baseline covariates, is statistically significant at the 10% level. This model suggests that
the threat of activism on a peer firm leads to a decrease in 8-K disclosure by 95.4% in the
two years following the campaign announcement. However, when the quarter fixed effects
are incorporated in Column (4), the effect is positive and no longer statistically significant.
And while the coefficient .710 is economically large in this model, the reported standard
error of .424 is also quite large. However, the Year Fixed Effects Model is the most
informative and best fitting regression given the high R-Squared relative to the number of
variables included. These primary results contradict the findings of Bourveau and
Schoenfeld (2016), as the threat of activism decreases disclosure provided in 8-K filings,
perhaps attributable to this study’s focus on industrials companies.
In contrast to the peer firms, the results suggest that activist intervention has a
positive effect on 8-K word count of targeted firms in the two years post campaign start
date. Relative to the Simple Difference in Column (1), the estimated effect is larger and
the statistical significance is stronger in the second and third columns where I include
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covariates and year fixed effects. In Column (3), the activist intervention leads to a 59.1%
increase in 8-K word count from the two years pre campaign to the two years post. I can
conclude that the effect of activist intervention on 8-K word count is statistically significant
at the 5% level, despite a somewhat large standard error.
When quarter fixed effects are included in Column (4), the estimated effect, while
still positive, decreases and the model is no longer statistically significant at conventional
levels. Once again, the Year Fixed Effects Model is the most informative and best fitting
regression given the high R-Squared relative to the number of variables included. These
findings differ from previous literature published by Chen and Jung (2015) as activist
campaigns appear to increase disclosure provided in 8-K filings over the two-year time
horizon post intervention.
II. Robustness
II.1. Time Horizon
In an attempt to further validate these findings, I perform several robustness checks
beginning with narrowing the time horizon over which the change in 8-K word count is
observed. Table 6 highlights the one-year pre and post regression outcomes with Simple
Difference in Column (1), Including Effect of Controls in Colum (2), Year Fixed Effects
in Column (3), and Year-Quarter Fixed Effects in Colum (4).
In the case of the control peer firms, the statistical significance of Column (3) is
much weaker than in Table 5, but Columns (1) and (4) are highly statistically significant
(at the 1% level). This illustrates the importance of including covariates and year-quarter
fixed effects in the model as the fit improves significantly. Both models provide evidence
19

that the threat of activism increases 8-K word count disclosure in the period shortly
following the campaign announcement. This suggests that peer firms in the industrials
space provide additional disclosure in the year immediately following an intervention on
their closest comparable. Column (4), which includes quarter fixed effects and baseline
controls, suggests that peer firms see a word count increase of 163% when faced with the
threat of activism. As such, these shorter horizon findings corroborate Bourveau and
Schoenfeld’s (2016) paper.
While the statistical significance of the target firm results in Columns (1) through
(3) is much weaker than that of Table 5, surprisingly there is a negative effect on disclosure
in this shorter period. Columns (2) and (4) yield statistically significant results where we
can reject the null of no change to filing count at the 10% level. More specifically, the
results from Column (4) suggest that activist intervention leads to a -91.1% change in 8-K
word count. In contrast to the two-year post campaign period, these results paint an
interesting picture of management disclosure for industrials companies facing activist
campaigns. In other words, these results are more in line with Chen and Jung (2015) and
Khurana et al. (2017).
Between Tables 5 and 6, I can conclude that the threat of activism may cause peer
firms to release additional disclosure at the outset. However, over a longer horizon,
disclosure drops off and the effect appears to become increasingly negative relative to the
pre-event environment. While this study does not empirically attempt to determine the
cause of this trend, it is possible that the perceived threat of activism is higher right after a
campaign is announced as hedge funds are known for their short-term agendas.
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Management may believe that the activist is more likely to immediately initiate a second
campaign. However, as the campaign matures, the perceived threat of activism decreases
as the activist becomes closer to exiting the position and pursuing a new intervention in a
different industry. Thus, the positive results observed in Table 6 could indicate that
management provides more disclosure in the shorter horizon as a defensive measure. And,
the negative results observed in Table 5 could indicate management sees less need to
provide additional disclosure in the longer horizon as the threat dissipates.
Further, I can conclude that managers at firms targeted by activists become more
hesitant to release additional guidance when they are initially under attack. However, over
a longer horizon, the amount of guidance provided increases relative to the pre-event
environment. This directly contrasts with the actions of the peer firm, and thus a couple
alternative scenarios could help explain the motivations of managers facing a campaign:
1. It is possible the initial shock and uncertainty surrounding a recent campaign
announcement makes management more reluctant to provide additional disclosure
in the one-year post. However, as more information surrounding the campaign
becomes available, management becomes more inclined to provide additional
disclosure.
2. It is also possible that the initial decrease in disclosure is met with an increase in
demand for disclosure from existing shareholders or the activist fund. This may
lead to an overcorrection in disclosure provided by management as illustrated by
the positive results seen in Table 5.
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However, a clear limitation of this paper is that it does not determine which of these above
effects drives the results depicted in Tables 5 and 6. Furthermore, this paper does not
distinguish whether the additional disclosure is material to investors.
II.2. Filings Count
I perform a secondary robustness check by evaluating an alternative proxy for
disclosure: the number of 8-Ks filed. As discussed in He and Plumlee (2020), this is an
additional appropriate measure for voluntary disclosure. Now the model can be written as:
∆ln 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑎𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑡
Where ∆ ln 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the natural logarithm of 8-K filing count for treatment firm i of pair
j, 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 is a binary variable denoting whether the company faced an activist
intervention, and 𝑎𝑡 are the time fixed effects common to the firm pair. Because activist
intervention may be correlated with time related trends, I once again include these fixed
effects to ensure that 𝛿1 is unbiased.
The above regression is then estimated using OLS and Table 7 reflects the results
over the two-years pre and post event horizon. Columns (1) through (4) support the
statistically significant findings in Table 5 as the threat of activism also leads to a decrease
in control firm filings count over the two-year time horizon. Both the Simple Difference
and Year Fixed effects models are statistically significant and negative for the peer firms
at the 10% level. For the Year Fixed-Effects model, there appears to be a 40.4% decrease
in the number of 8-Ks filed in the post event period. This statistically significant drop
reinforces the view that managers of peer firms in the industrials space are less likely to
offer additional disclosure in the two-year period following an intervention of their closest
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competitor. Thus, these results, in combination with Table 5 suggest that peer firms not
only file fewer 8-Ks after an intervention, but they are shorter, as well.
Columns (1) through (4) also reveal that the effect on the targeted firms’ number of
8-Ks filed is positive and highly statistically significant. This supports the findings from
Table 5, as there appears to be a clear increase in voluntary disclosure in the two years post
campaign start. For instance, when an activist is present, the number of 8-K filings
increases by 91.6% as seen in Column (4). The inclusion of covariates, year fixed effects
and quarter fixed effects, brings the R-Squared to .482 in Column (4), while maintaining
significance at the 5% level. As such, in the context of this study of industrials companies,
measuring voluntary disclosure through of 8-K filing count is quite robust. These findings,
combined with those from Table 5 suggest that not only are there more filings released in
the two years post campaign, but they are longer, as well.
For both the control and treatment groups the effects over the longer time horizon
are well defined, but they are less clear for in the one-year pre and post model. As seen in
Table 8, there is no evidence of statistical significance in any of the four regressions.
Furthermore, the results do not appear to be economically significant due to the large
standard errors associated with the estimates. It is also worth noting that the inclusion of
covariates and year fixed effects causes the coefficients to become quite small. However,
the trend that appears between the differing time horizons in Tables 7 and 8 could be
explained with the same reasons as Tables 5 and 6. In a general sense, the results and
robustness checks point to a clear trend of decreasing voluntary disclosure in the longer
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time horizon as attributable to the perceived threat of activism for peer firms, and the
inverse for targeted firms.
III. Net Effect Results
When combined, the coefficients for ActivistEvent and Constant represent the net
effect an activist intervention has on the disclosure for the control and treatment groups.
Table 9 reports the linear combination of these two variables for both disclosure proxies
and time horizons of interest. In Panel A, the net effect of activist intervention on word
count disclosure in the two years post is positive and statistically significant in Columns
(1) and (2). However, this effect seems to be absorbed when the year and quarter fixed
effects are incorporated in Columns (3) and (4) which are not statistically significant.
Furthermore, as seen in Panel B, the net effect in the one-year horizon is not statistically
significant at any level, and the coefficients are relatively small with large standard errors.
That said, the net effect of hedge fund activism on filings count in Panel C does
appear to be positive and statistically significant over the two-year horizon. When controls
are incorporated in Column (2), the number of filings increases by 37.8% with a
significance at the 5% level. When quarter fixed effects are also integrated in Column (4),
the coefficient is smaller and significance is weaker, but still represents a 29.2% increase
in filings at the 10% level. However, the net effect remains less clear in the shorter time
horizon as seen in Panel D. Here, there is only statistical significance in the simple
differences model at the 10% level, but the coefficient is relatively small. And, when
additional variables are incorporated, the outcome is no longer statistically significant, and
the coefficients remain economically insignificant.
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Taken together, these findings suggest that activist interventions have an
overwhelmingly positive net effect on voluntary disclosure over a longer time horizon. As
seen through Panels A and C, both 8-K word count and the number of files released
increases. However, the net effect for the shorter horizon remains less clear, as there does
not appear to be a significant increase or decrease in voluntary disclosure in the one-year
post campaign. Thus, I can conclude that hedge fund activism does indeed materially
influence voluntary disclosure following a campaign, but the effect may not be immediate.
Conclusion
A large and growing body of literature has illustrated that management behavior
changes in light of an activist campaign. In this study, I have asked whether the threat of
activism also affects voluntary disclosure for companies operating in the industrials space.
I find this to indeed be the case, as there are empirical differences between the amount of
disclosure, with respect to 8-K word count, provided by management in the time periods
before and after a campaign is announced. This paper also examines the number of 8-Ks
filed, another commonly used proxy for voluntary disclosure. Once again, controlling for
time fixed effects, the results indicate a material change in the amount of disclosure
provided, particularly over a longer time horizon.
These findings contribute to the understanding of how hedge fund activists impact
both target and non-target companies, in the scope of a specific industry. Further, the highly
significant results suggest that word count and number of filings are robust measures of
voluntary disclosure. And, while other studies look at a broad set of industries, these
outcomes provide novel evidence of changes in management behavior for companies in
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the industrials sector. Finally, with the use of an updated set of data, these results continue
to support the findings of papers published earlier in the decade, suggesting that while
activist strategies have fundamentally changed, defensive responses remain the same.
Further research may focus on voluntary disclosure in other industries, such as
Financial Institutions and Technology, that consistently face large volumes of hedge fund
activist activity. Several studies have also emphasized the importance of specialized cases
of intervention, such as proxy wars or ESG initiatives, (e.g., Baginski et al., 2012; Baloria
et al., 2019), which provides another direction for additional research. Additionally, the
results published in this paper could be further refined to consider the impacts within the
subsectors of industrials: materials, industrial products, and industrial services.
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Table 1: Distribution of Activist Campaigns by Year and Subsector
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Table 2: Variable Definitions
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Table 3: Logit Regression Results for Propensity Score Matching
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Activist Targeted Firms and Treatment Firms
All Balance Sheet line items are scaled by Total Assets, except for Log Total Assets. The
variables reported in Panel A reflect the financial status of the firm in the quarter of the
campaign start date. The Subscript A indicates an activism firm while the subscript M
indicates a matched peer firm.
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Table 5: Difference in Differences for Word Count Two Years Pre and Post Event
This table reports the regression of the control and treatment firms’ change in 8-K word
count on contemporaneous changes in firm characteristics. The pre period is [-2 years, 0),
and the post period is [0, +2 years], where day 0 is the announcement date of the activist
investor campaign.
Variables
Activist Event
Constant

(1)
Simple Difference

(2)
Controls

(3)
Year FE

(4)
Year-Quarter FE

0.519*
(0.263)
-0.304
(0.248)

0.545**
(0.260)
0.389
(0.429)
0.160
(0.104)
-0.216*
(0.117)
-0.0478
(0.0527)
-1.463*
(0.759)
-1.173***
(0.440)
0.189
(0.540)
-2.817
(5.738)
9.921
(16.12)
-0.137
(3.261)
0.173
(0.195)
N
N

0.591**
(0.284)
-0.954*
(0.520)
0.186
(0.131)
-0.258*
(0.138)
-0.0527
(0.0557)
-1.999**
(0.780)
-1.071**
(0.453)
0.181
(0.625)
-1.655
(6.286)
2.025
(17.86)
-1.716
(3.091)
0.301
(0.184)
Y
N

0.0984
(0.424)
0.710
(0.455)
0.188
(0.154)
-0.187
(0.192)
-0.0125
(0.0760)
-1.577
(1.087)
-1.165*
(0.638)
-0.189
(0.738)
-2.524
(9.266)
-0.112
(16.77)
-1.948
(3.772)
0.103
(0.276)
N
Y

92
0.241

92
0.309

Log Market Cap
Log Total Assets
Market to Book
Cash
Debt
Intangibles
Capex
Research & Development
Return on Assets
Dividend per Share
Year Fixed Effects
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

N
N

92
92
0.021
0.143
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Difference in Differences for Word Count One Year Pre and Post Event
This table reports the regression of the control and treatment firms’ change in 8-K word
count on contemporaneous changes in firm characteristics. The pre period is [-1 year, 0),
and the post period is [0, +1 year], where day 0 is the announcement date of the activist
investor campaign.
Variables
Activist Event
Constant

(1)
Simple Difference

(2)
Controls

(3)
Year FE

(4)
Year-Quarter FE

-0.153
(0.125)
0.211***
(0.0713)

-0.392*
(0.220)
0.428
(0.438)
0.0180
(0.112)
-0.0352
(0.130)
0.0317
(0.0579)
-1.238
(0.963)
-0.724
(0.646)
0.614
(0.611)
-0.266
(6.388)
49.32**
(20.16)
-2.096
(3.753)
0.348
(0.240)
N
N

-0.456
(0.295)
-0.130
(0.576)
0.111
(0.128)
-0.142
(0.138)
0.00947
(0.0598)
-2.042*
(1.110)
-0.781
(0.738)
0.605
(0.715)
0.0609
(7.720)
38.97*
(21.55)
-3.408
(3.801)
0.462**
(0.228)
Y
N

-0.911*
(0.501)
1.613***
(0.536)
0.0976
(0.177)
-0.0466
(0.211)
0.0347
(0.0808)
-1.363
(1.103)
-0.882
(0.753)
0.238
(0.862)
-2.045
(9.849)
52.00**
(22.89)
-4.441
(3.928)
0.143
(0.296)
N
Y

Log Market Cap
Log Total Assets
Market to Book
Cash
Debt
Intangibles
Capex
Research & Development
Return on Assets
Dividend per Share
Year Fixed Effects
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

N
N

92
92
92
0.001
0.161
0.264
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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92
0.381

Table 7: Difference in Differences for Filings Count Two Years Pre and Post Event
This table reports the regression of the control and treatment firms’ change in number of
8-Ks filed on contemporaneous changes in firm characteristics. The pre period is [-2 years,
0), and the post period is [0, +2 years], where day 0 is the announcement date of the activist
investor campaign.
Variables
Activist Event
Constant

(1)
Simple Difference

(2)
Controls

(3)
Year FE

(4)
Year-Quarter FE

0.417***
(0.118)
-0.304*
(0.161)

0.425***
(0.152)
-0.0468
(0.224)
0.0110
(0.0741)
-0.0424
(0.0798)
-0.0275
(0.0281)
-0.355
(0.340)
-0.443
(0.292)
0.322
(0.223)
-4.137
(3.386)
8.187
(9.685)
0.129
(1.246)
0.0458
(0.107)
N
N

0.429***
(0.126)
-0.404*
(0.210)
0.0379
(0.0733)
-0.0716
(0.0775)
-0.0282
(0.0283)
-0.581
(0.362)
-0.449
(0.276)
0.296
(0.220)
-2.605
(3.303)
5.637
(8.777)
-0.606
(1.057)
0.0716
(0.103)
Y
N

0.916**
(0.367)
-0.625
(0.422)
0.0107
(0.0728)
-0.0433
(0.0772)
-0.0227
(0.0354)
-0.0324
(0.368)
-0.221
(0.321)
0.401
(0.324)
-4.824
(3.205)
10.38
(11.01)
-0.0402
(1.310)
0.0882
(0.127)
N
Y

92
0.285

92
0.482

Log Market Cap
Log Total Assets
Market to Book
Cash
Debt
Intangibles
Capex
Research & Development
Return on Assets
Dividend per Share
Year Fixed Effects
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

N
N

92
92
0.064
0.148
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Difference in Differences for Filings Count One Year Pre and Post Event
This table reports the regression of the control and treatment firms’ change in number of
8-Ks filed on contemporaneous changes in firm characteristics. The pre period is [-1 year,
0), and the post period is [0, +1 year], where day 0 is the announcement date of the activist
investor campaign.
Variables
Activist Event
Constant

(1)
Simple Difference

(2)
Controls

(3)
Year FE

(4)
Year-Quarter FE

0.163
(0.150)
-0.0839
(0.195)

0.0565
(0.175)
-0.0782
(0.271)
0.0230
(0.0753)
-0.0246
(0.0847)
-0.0232
(0.0331)
-0.130
(0.317)
-0.223
(0.320)
0.571**
(0.259)
-2.997
(3.537)
22.97**
(9.354)
-0.166
(1.700)
0.0560
(0.128)
N
N

-0.0442
(0.147)
0.0795
(0.268)
0.0776
(0.0805)
-0.0811
(0.0856)
-0.0314
(0.0316)
-0.442
(0.363)
-0.253
(0.332)
0.517*
(0.275)
-1.718
(3.922)
19.65**
(9.207)
-1.098
(1.496)
0.0958
(0.122)
Y
N

0.396
(0.376)
-0.599
(0.415)
0.000685
(0.0857)
-0.0167
(0.103)
0.00361
(0.0451)
-0.145
(0.416)
-0.121
(0.399)
0.625
(0.423)
-4.970
(4.376)
24.16**
(11.31)
-1.211
(2.017)
0.102
(0.162)
N
Y

92
0.288

92
0.386

Log Market Cap
Log Total Assets
Market to Book
Cash
Debt
Intangibles
Capex
Research & Development
Return on Assets
Dividend per Share
Year Fixed Effects
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

N
N

92
92
0.007
0.143
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Net Effect of Activist Intervention
This table reports the point estimates, standard errors, and significance for the linear
combination of the coefficients for control and treatment firms’ change in in disclosure.
This represents the net effect of activist intervention on change in disclosure.
Panel A: Word Count Two Years Pre and Post Event

Net Effect

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Simple Difference

Controls

Year FE

Year-Quarter FE

0.215**

0.934**

-0.363

0.809

(0.086)

(0.430)

(0.513)

(0.532)

Panel B: Word Count One Year Pre and Post Event

Net Effect

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Simple Difference

Controls

Year FE

Year-Quarter FE

0.058

0.036

-0.586

0.702

(0.103)

(0.472)

(0.605)

(0.578)

Panel C: Filing Count Two Years Pre and Post Event

Net Effect

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Simple Difference

Controls

Year FE

Year-Quarter FE

0.112***

0.378**

0.025

0.292*

(0.038)

(0.164)

(0.178)

(0.162)

Panel D: Filing Count One Year Pre and Post Event

Net Effect

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Simple Difference

Controls

Year FE

Year-Quarter FE

0.079*

-0.022

0.035

-0.203

(0.046)
(0.218)
(0.250)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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(0.218)
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